Saturday, August 9, 2008

Normal'no

When I woke up yesterday morning, I noticed nothing out of the ordinary. The sun was already shining and there was a light breeze outside - a generally pleasant day. I was looking forward to the start of the Olympics, although NBC decided, certainly with viewer satisfaction as its sole consideration, to broadcast the Opening Cermonies in the United States twelve hours after they actually occurred.

But then I turned on my computer, and saw the news: Russian tanks were in Georgia. That's not to say that it was unexpected. Moscow has been rattling the sabers in Georgia's direction virtually since the Rose Revolution brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power in 2003. I saw firsthand the almost nightly anti-Tbilisi propaganda on Russian television during the two months I recently spent in the country (I returned home just last Sunday). It was always a matter of when, not if. Indeed, the violence of the past few days is not really about South Ossetia or even Georgia, specifically; it is part of the megalomania of Putin and his Moscow cronies, part of a desire for absolute control over anything and everything they can get their hands on.

I remember very well my first day in Russia, just over two months ago now. I arrived in St. Petersburg around noon on a Sunday, and was picked up at the airport and driven to the apartment where I would be living for the next couple of months in an old Lada that probably would not be street legal in the US or Western Europe (not to mention what seemed to be an intentional flouting of every traffic law on the books). Upon arrival, I met with my host, a man educated in the Soviet days as an engineer but working in construction as a result of the troubles of the 90s. We got the "Putin conversation" out of the way surprisingly early: while he did not agree with the Russian Prime Minister's anti-democratic tendencies, he told me in his limited English (my Russian then was far worse than it is now) that "Russia needs a tsar." Putin, he said, was that man: someone who could bring stability to a troubled Russian realm, but at the expense of freedoms for the Russian people.

Yet despite his acceptance of Russia's de facto leader, this was a man who did not completely trust his government, and in a very different way from, for example, the widespread lack of trust in President Bush in the United States. My host got his news from the western media - he read news online (itself rare in Russia) on a website that printed translations of articles from the New York Times, the Financial Times, the BBC, etc. He didn't watch Russian television news either, since virtually all of the major stations are little more than Kremlin voiceboxes. Instead, he watched EuroNews, a 24 hour news channel that broadcasts across Europe in many languages. He told me during my first week in St. Petersburg that it wasn't worth watching NTV or Channel 1 or Vesti - all you could ever get from them was what United Russia wanted you to know. Not to mention that by law in Russia, half of every news broadcast must be good news, usually consisting of reports glorifying Putin's policy decisions for that day and congratulating Medvedev on visiting another factory or museum.

What every western visitor to Russia will notice, regardless of knowledge of the Russian language, is the bloated police force, or militsiya, with groups of its officers on every street corner. It is virtually impossible to walk the length of a block in Petersburg without passing a police officer. And when any gathering of people is expected, the number of increases to the point that they form human walls around whatever area they are protecting (and I use that term loosely - it is common wisdom in Russia to avoid getting involved with the militsiya if at all possible). To walk the streets of a Russian city is to be watched at all times; the country has enough men in uniform to give the impression of being a true police state.

And indeed, they often behave in a similar manner. It is entirely normal and legal for an officer to stop someone and require him to show his internal passport with no cause. In the case of a foreigner, the range of documents is somewhat wider - in addition to the passport, the visitor must also produce a valid visa and registration documents (the Russian government still requires foreign visitors to register in every city that they visit for more than about a day). But the people who are actually stopped for document checks are in fact a very small group - those with dark hair and dark skin (meaning anything darker than pale white). In other words, those who look as if they are from the Caucasus region. And if that were not bad enough, officers are always overjoyed to find passports that are doubling as wallets - a few bills between the pages are expected if one hopes to avoid a trip to the station itself.

Perhaps what is most disturbing is the general population's embrace of Putin and his ultranationalist policies, often translating into xenophobia. More than once while in Russia, merely the fact that I was not speaking Russian with my American friends led to not-so-discreet pointing and whispering of inostrantsy - foreigners. Often, the Russians around us had no idea what language we were speaking (we were asked if we were speaking, among others, Turkish, Uzbek, and Hebrew), but the fact that we were "other" meant that we were never truly welcomed by much of the population. Certainly, there are places that have something of a national superiority complex - the United States probably falls into this category - but Russia's nationalism goes far beyond that. Many Russians believe that they deserve to control the areas that were lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that the successor states are obliged to look up to the Great Motherland.

And throughout this conflict, the Russian media, which I am closely tracking online partly to try to get both sides of the story and partly for the entertainment value of its often-absurd claims, has not let up on its assault against everyone not in lock-step with its aims in Georgia. Its claims have run the gamut from ethnic cleansing of South Ossetia to an assertion that the United States Government is directly responsible for the outbreak of violence. All media sources, of course, have some bias, and neither the Russian nor the Georgian side can be taken as gospel truth. But what the people of the Russian Federation are being fed goes beyond normal wartime patriotism - it is deliberate ignorance of the truth. Worse, few seem to question what is reported. Perhaps it is part of the still-strong Soviet cultural legacy. Perhaps it is misplaced confidence in the current government. In any case, my host in Petersburg notwithstanding, those even informed about current events from multiple perspectives in Russia are very few.

The Russian language has a word that is used when everything is as usual or ordinary - нормально, normal'no. When I heard of the Russian actions against Georgia, my first reaction was surprise, but soon after, it was this thouroughly Russian concept that, for me, best described the situation. Yes, Moscow's tanks were a few miles south of where they had been on the 7th. But was this a change in the Putinist policy of the past eight years? Not at all. Was this at all unpredictable or unexpected? No. Those watching Russia closely knew that something like this would happen some day. Now it is time for the world to wake up and realize what Russia is become as it nears twenty years of existence in its current form.

Friday, August 8, 2008

The War in Georgia

By now, I'm sure that we've all heard about what's going on in Georgia. Several comments:

1) The War - Unlike what's been suggested in the NYT, the timing of Georgia's operation was not set to coïncide with the Olympics, rather the timing of Russia's invasion was. The evidence:

a) Up until the beginning of August, all regional eyes were focused on Abkhazia, where through deft diplomacy and compromise, Mikhail Saakashvili had managed to craft a plan to bring piece to the region, by giving the Abkhaz wide autonomy. As the weeks wore on, Russia came under greater and greater pressure to allow the Abkhaz to accept the Georgian plan.

b) For the past two months, Russia has been slowly massing troops on the Ossetian section of the Georgian border (there is a trans-Caucasian tunnel there). There have been incidents involving Georgian sightings of Russian aircraft, a dud Russian missile that landed in Georgian territory, and the shooting down of an unmanned Georgian drone. When the West didn't force Russia to back down, the buildup continued.

c) There has been fighting in South Ossetia since at the latest August 1. The Russians chose August 8th to invade, so that the Olympics would mask their troop movements, just as the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan occurred over the Christmas holiday.

2) The Olympics - Russia was very clever to invade when it did. Its sad remark upon American society that we are more concerned with the opening ceremonies of the Olympic games (and to some degree the revelation that a washed-up, moronic ex-pol. had an affair), than the invasion of a sovereign, democratic, free state. This is Munich, 1938. Except now, Russia has taken the place of Nazi Germany. The World has looked on and protested feebly (if at all) as the people of Russia have let their freedoms be eroded, beginning with multi-party politics, continuing through the destruction of the independent media, violent attacks on ethnic minorities (frighteningly popular), the rise of a youth arm of the dictatorship (Nashi, anyone?), and now moving on to conquest of its neighbors/former colonies.

3) Georgia - while not the World's best functioning democracy, as shown by the protests last November, is a democratic state. Mikhail Saakashvili again demonstrated his mandate in January, when he won 53% of the vote (albeit amidst some, minor allegations of vote-rigging). Its citizens enjoy a free press, freedom of speech, and the right to choose their political leaders. They are able to exercise their economic freedoms as well - Georgia is a liberal (economically) nation, surrounded on 2 sides by dictatorships (Russia and its stooge Armenia). It is the West's easternmost bastion of liberty. In short, it is Czechoslovakia of the 1930s, in the 2000s.

4) Turkey - doesn't much like Russia. It has recently organized an economic and semi-political alliance between itself, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. After 2 centuries of invasion over the Caucasus, it is not going to accept Russian troops on its border. Earlier today, they agreed to supply Georgia with electricity for the duration of this crisis.

5) South Ossetia - as an American diplomat made it clear at the UN, this is not about ethnic cleansing. In the early 1990s, local militias, backed by Russia, drove ethnic Georgians (then the majority) out of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They have yet to return. Georgia, upon retaking disputed areas, has shown itself to be moderate and forgiving in its rule. Ajaria (retaken a few years back) has prospered.

6) Geopolitics - Russia wants a trans-Caucasian foothold. The two ways around the extremely tall ( > 10,000 ft) Caucasus are on the two costs (Abkhazia and Azerbaijan) and through a mountain pass, or a tunnel in the center (South Ossetia). Is it thus surprising that Russia has taken an interest in these regions?

7) Further Expansion - Russia and Belarus have already nearly merged several times in the past. Georgia is the first democracy that has been targeted. You can bet that Ukraine is next.

In closing, the words of Saakashvili when interviewed on CNN:

CNN: What should the West and the United States do now?
Saakashvili: Wake up! Wake up. What is happening now is not about Georgia; it is about the basic values the West has...the basic values the US has always preached [to] us...and if the West doesn't defend those values they will be under threat today in Georgia, tomorrow elsewhere.

Introduction

Towards the Radical Center is a culmination of years of thought:

The name comes from Catbird Press's critical editions of Karel Capek's works. The viewpoint is that of a centrist in American terms. Fed up with partisan bickering, too smart to know that one side has a monopoly on correct positions, and too cynical to believe in politicians. I will advocate intelligent, balanced policy, at times justified by the preponderance of American opinion, at other times not.

NB:

1) The New York Times is the best paper we've got. The WSJ doesn't cover all the news by any stretch of the imagination; European newspapers are partisan rags; and the Washington Post is more thickly liberal than the Times could ever be (though it does have the best Op-Ed page).

2) My opinions are often similar to those in the Economist. I'm generally a big proponent of free markets and freer trade (unlike the Democrats).

3) At the same time, I do not ignore pressing issues (unlike the Republicans), and believe that given smart policy choices, the Government can do things right. The civil service is fixable, Congress may never be; though the failures of either do not justify inaction by the government.

4) There are a lot of threats out in the World today. I will call a spade a spade. At the same time, I'm a firm believer in American ingenuity (the cynicism hasn't killed that yet).

5) I support Israel (see the JPost link).

6) I don't like Barack Obama. He's a pol. See Ryan Lizza's article in the New Yorker.